The Firm-Bank Interaction Regime and "Softness"
Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 10 (2000) no. 1, p. 37
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This paper is analyzing a dynamic evolutionary game of firm-bank
interaction to underline the importance of the interaction regime for encouraging or
discouraging soft-budget phenomena and financial disorder. The poor performance of
public sector's firms, which led globally to quests for the contraction of that sector and
privatizations, is viewed as an equilibrium situation, ascribed to the inadequate
attention of policy to the interaction regime. Moreover, it is found out that the
background of the transition economies is such as to require even at equilibrium, a
regime fostering much stricter financial discipline than in the mixed economies.
Finally, it is argued that the abandonment of central planning was a necessary
condition, a prerequisite, for the removal of its softness.
@article{YJOR_2000_10_1_a3,
author = {Gerasimos T. Soldatos},
title = {The {Firm-Bank} {Interaction} {Regime} and {"Softness"}},
journal = {Yugoslav journal of operations research},
pages = {37 },
year = {2000},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
zbl = {1007.91502},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2000_10_1_a3/}
}
Gerasimos T. Soldatos. The Firm-Bank Interaction Regime and "Softness". Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 10 (2000) no. 1, p. 37 . http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2000_10_1_a3/