Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty
    
    
  
  
  
      
      
      
        
Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Matematika, mehanika, kompʹûternye nauki, Tome 30 (2020) no. 2, pp. 189-207
    
  
  
  
  
  
    
      
      
        
      
      
      
    Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru
            
              			The Strong Coalitional Equilibrium (SCE) is introduced for normal form games under uncertainty. This concept is based on the synthesis of the notions of individual rationality, collective rationality in normal form games without side payments, and a proposed coalitional rationality. For presentation simplicity, SCE is presented for 4-person games under uncertainty. Sufficient conditions for the existence of SCE in pure strategies are established via the saddle point of the Germeir's convolution function. Finally, following the approach of Borel, von Neumann and Nash, a theorem of existence of SCE in mixed strategies is proved under common minimal mathematical conditions for normal form games (compactness and convexity of players' strategy sets, compactness of uncertainty set and continuity of payoff functions).
			
            
            
            
          
        
      
                  
                    
                    
                    
                        
Keywords: 
normal form game, uncertainty, guarantee, mixed strategies, saddle point, equilibrium.
Mots-clés : Germeier convolution
                    
                  
                
                
                Mots-clés : Germeier convolution
@article{VUU_2020_30_2_a3,
     author = {V. I. Zhukovskiy and L. V. Zhukovskaya and K. N. Kudryavtsev and M. Larbani},
     title = {Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty},
     journal = {Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Matematika, mehanika, kompʹ\^uternye nauki},
     pages = {189--207},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {30},
     number = {2},
     year = {2020},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VUU_2020_30_2_a3/}
}
                      
                      
                    TY - JOUR AU - V. I. Zhukovskiy AU - L. V. Zhukovskaya AU - K. N. Kudryavtsev AU - M. Larbani TI - Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty JO - Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Matematika, mehanika, kompʹûternye nauki PY - 2020 SP - 189 EP - 207 VL - 30 IS - 2 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VUU_2020_30_2_a3/ LA - en ID - VUU_2020_30_2_a3 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A V. I. Zhukovskiy %A L. V. Zhukovskaya %A K. N. Kudryavtsev %A M. Larbani %T Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty %J Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Matematika, mehanika, kompʹûternye nauki %D 2020 %P 189-207 %V 30 %N 2 %I mathdoc %U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VUU_2020_30_2_a3/ %G en %F VUU_2020_30_2_a3
V. I. Zhukovskiy; L. V. Zhukovskaya; K. N. Kudryavtsev; M. Larbani. Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty. Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Matematika, mehanika, kompʹûternye nauki, Tome 30 (2020) no. 2, pp. 189-207. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VUU_2020_30_2_a3/
