Geodesic
Two-stage network games modeling the Belt and Road Initiative
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, Tome 18 (2022) no. 1, pp. 87-98 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.
Keywords: network games, imputation distribution procedure, the Shapley value, directed graph, convex game.
Mots-clés : subgame consistency 
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     title = {Two-stage network games modeling the {Belt} and {Road} {Initiative}},
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P. Suna; E. M. Parilina; H. W. Gaob. Two-stage network games modeling the Belt and Road Initiative. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, Tome 18 (2022) no. 1, pp. 87-98. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VSPUI_2022_18_1_a6/

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