Geodesic
One-way flow two-stage network games
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 4 (2014), pp. 72-81 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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In the paper two-stage network games are considered in which at the first stage players form a directed network, whereas at the second stage they choose feasible controls. It is assumed that payoffs of players depend on both the network and controls chosen by their “neighbors”. In a cooperative case we find cooperative behavior of players and consider the Shapley value as a solution of the game. It is proved that the Shapley value is time-inconsistent, therefore the dynamic Shapley value is defined with the use of imputation distribution procedure. Bibliogr. 9. Fig. 1. Table 1.
Keywords: network, cooperation, Shapley value, time-consistency. 
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L. A. Petrosyan; A. A. Sedakov. One-way flow two-stage network games. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 4 (2014), pp. 72-81. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VSPUI_2014_4_a7/

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