Geodesic
Duopoly in queueing system
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 4 (2013), pp. 32-41
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A non-cooperative two-person game which is related to the queueing system $ M/M/2 $ is considered. There are two services which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution with parameters $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ respectively. The stream forms the Poisson process with intensity $\lambda$. The problem of pricing and determining the optimal intensity for each firm in the competition and cooperation is solved. Increase of the number of players is also carried out. Bibliogr. 9. Tabl. 4.
Keywords: duopoly, equilibrium prices, queueing system. 
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A. V. Mazalova. Duopoly in queueing system. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 4 (2013), pp. 32-41. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VSPUI_2013_4_a3/

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