Geodesic
Bargaining model with incomplete information
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 1 (2012), pp. 33-40 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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A theoretical game model of bargaining between buyers and sellers with incomplete information related to deals is considered. A player (buyer or seller) has a private information about his reserved price. Reserved prices are random variables with known probability distributions. Each player declares a price which depends on his reserved price. If the bid price is above the quoted price the goods is sold for the average of two prices. Otherwise there is no deal. Two types of Bayes equilibrium are derived. One of them is a threshold form another is a solution of a differential equation system. Some numerical results are presented.
Keywords: bargaining model, seller-buyer interactions, incomplete information, differential equations for equilibrium. 
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V. V. Mazalov; A. Yu. Kondratyev. Bargaining model with incomplete information. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Prikladnaâ matematika, informatika, processy upravleniâ, no. 1 (2012), pp. 33-40. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/VSPUI_2012_1_a4/

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