Trajectories of dynamic equilibrium and replicator dynamics in coordination games

Nikolay A. Krasovskii   ; Alexander M. Tarasyev

Ural mathematical journal, Tome 10 (2024) no. 2, pp. 92-106

Résumé

The paper analyzes average integral payoff indices for trajectories of the dynamic equilibrium and replicator dynamics in bimatrix coordination games. In such games, players receive large payoffs when choosing the same type of behavior. A special feature of a $2\times2$ coordination game is the presence of three static Nash equilibria. In the dynamic formulation, the trajectories of coordination games are estimated by the average integral payoffs for a wide range of models arising in economics and biology. In optimal control problems and dynamic games, average integral payoffs are used to synthesize guaranteed strategies, which are involved, among other things, in the constructions of the dynamic Nash equilibrium. In addition, average integral payoffs are a natural tool for assessing the quality of trajectories of replicator dynamics. In the paper, we compare values of average integral indices for trajectories of replicator dynamics and trajectories generated by guaranteed strategies in constructing the dynamic Nash equilibrium. An analysis is provided for trajectories of mixed dynamics when the first player plays a guaranteed strategy, and the behavior of replicator dynamics guides the second player.

Détail

Keywords: Coordination games, Average integral payoffs, Guaranteed strategies, Replicator dynamics, Dynamic Nash equilibrium
Mots-clés : Dynamic bimatrix games

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