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Investment timing and quantity strategies under asymmetric information
Teoriâ veroâtnostej i ee primeneniâ, Tome 61 (2016) no. 1, pp. 165-173 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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X. Cui; T. Shibata. Investment timing and quantity strategies under asymmetric information. Teoriâ veroâtnostej i ee primeneniâ, Tome 61 (2016) no. 1, pp. 165-173. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TVP_2016_61_1_a8/

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[6] Shibata T., Nishihara M., “Interaction between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: Costs and benefits of privatized firms”, European J. Oper. Res., 215:3 (2011), 688–696 | MR | Zbl