@article{TVP_2016_61_1_a5,
author = {S. Aboura and E. Lepinette},
title = {New developments on the {Modigliani{\textendash}Miller} theorem},
journal = {Teori\^a vero\^atnostej i ee primeneni\^a},
pages = {114--128},
year = {2016},
volume = {61},
number = {1},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TVP_2016_61_1_a5/}
}
S. Aboura; E. Lepinette. New developments on the Modigliani–Miller theorem. Teoriâ veroâtnostej i ee primeneniâ, Tome 61 (2016) no. 1, pp. 114-128. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TVP_2016_61_1_a5/
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