Equilibrium in a pricing model for a public transport market

V. V. Mazalov   ; E. N. Konovalchikova

Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 30 (2024) no. 3, pp. 182-190

Résumé

A game-theoretic model of pricing in an urban public transport market is considered. It is assumed that the players in the model are transport companies serving urban public transport routes, and the distribution of passengers along the routes is subject to the Hotelling specification. The study focuses on the Nash equilibrium in the pricing game in the transport services market. The results of numerical modeling are presented using the example of the transport system in the city of Petrozavodsk.

Détail

Keywords: Nash equilibrium, public transport market, Hotelling specification.

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