Geodesic
A mathematical model of the economics of railway cargo transportation
Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 20 (2014) no. 4, pp. 44-59 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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The transportation mathematical programming problem is modified for the analysis of the economics of railway cargo transportation in modern Russia. A variation principle in the form of a pair of mutually dual convex programming problems is constructed, and a competitive equilibrium in the railway transportation model is found from this principle. An approach to the analysis of imperfect competition, distribution of the intermediary's profit, and the role of communication constraints in a transportation network is proposed.
Keywords: public goods, cargo transportation model, Fenchel theorem, Legendre–Young–Fenchel transform, competitive equilibrium.
Mots-clés : communication constrains 
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M. P. Vashchenko; Ya. S. Pronin; A. A. Shananin. A mathematical model of the economics of railway cargo transportation. Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 20 (2014) no. 4, pp. 44-59. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2014_20_4_a4/

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