Geodesic
Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game
Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 17 (2011) no. 1, pp. 201-216
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A stochastic infinitely repeated $\varepsilon$-best response game is analyzed, in which a $2\times2$ bimatrix game is played sequentially in an infinite number of rounds. The limits of the players' expected average gains in the first $n$ rounds of the game as $n\to\infty$ are calculated. These limits are taken as the players' expected average gains in the infinitely repeated $\varepsilon$-best response game. The players' Nash-equilibrium behaviors are described. It is shown that the players' equilibrium gains exceed their gains in the deterministic best-response game.
Keywords: repeated games, best response.
Mots-clés : bimatrix games 
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A. V. Raigorodskaya. Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game. Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 17 (2011) no. 1, pp. 201-216. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2011_17_1_a16/

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