Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game
    
    
  
  
  
      
      
      
        
Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 17 (2011) no. 1, pp. 201-216
    
  
  
  
  
  
    
      
      
        
      
      
      
    Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru
            
              			A stochastic infinitely repeated $\varepsilon$-best response game is analyzed, in which a $2\times2$ bimatrix game is played sequentially in an infinite number of rounds. The limits of the players' expected average gains in the first $n$ rounds of the game as $n\to\infty$ are calculated. These limits are taken as the players' expected average gains in the infinitely repeated $\varepsilon$-best response game. The players' Nash-equilibrium behaviors are described. It is shown that the players' equilibrium gains exceed their gains in the deterministic best-response game.
			
            
            
            
          
        
      
                  
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                      
Keywords: 
repeated games, best response.
Mots-clés : bimatrix games
                    
                  
                
                
                Mots-clés : bimatrix games
@article{TIMM_2011_17_1_a16,
     author = {A. V. Raigorodskaya},
     title = {Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game},
     journal = {Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki},
     pages = {201--216},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {17},
     number = {1},
     year = {2011},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2011_17_1_a16/}
}
                      
                      
                    TY - JOUR AU - A. V. Raigorodskaya TI - Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game JO - Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki PY - 2011 SP - 201 EP - 216 VL - 17 IS - 1 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2011_17_1_a16/ LA - ru ID - TIMM_2011_17_1_a16 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A A. V. Raigorodskaya %T Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game %J Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki %D 2011 %P 201-216 %V 17 %N 1 %I mathdoc %U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2011_17_1_a16/ %G ru %F TIMM_2011_17_1_a16
A. V. Raigorodskaya. Equilibrium behaviors of the players in an infinitely repeated $2\times2$ $\varepsilon$-best response game. Trudy Instituta matematiki i mehaniki, Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, Tome 17 (2011) no. 1, pp. 201-216. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/TIMM_2011_17_1_a16/
