Geodesic
A minimax approach to mean field games
Sbornik. Mathematics, Tome 206 (2015) no. 7, pp. 893-920 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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An initial boundary value problem for the system of equations of a determined mean field game is considered. The proposed definition of a generalized solution is based on the minimax approach to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We prove the existence of the generalized (minimax) solution using the Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary differential game with infinitely many identical players. We show that the minimax solution of the original system provides the $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the differential game with a finite number of players. Bibliography: 34 titles.
Keywords: mean-field-games, Hamilton-Jacobi equations, minimax solution, Nash equilibrium, differential game with infinitely many players. 
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Yu. V. Averboukh. A minimax approach to mean field games. Sbornik. Mathematics, Tome 206 (2015) no. 7, pp. 893-920. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/SM_2015_206_7_a0/

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