Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games
Serdica Journal of Computing, Tome 11 (2017) no. 1, pp. 059-072
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Bulgarian Digital Mathematics Library
The problem of manipulation in voting is fundamental and has
received attention in recent research in game theory. In this paper, we consider
two cases of manipulation in weighted voting games done by merging
of coalitions into single players and by annexation of a part or all of the
voting weights of another player viewed from two perspectives: of the effect
of swings of players and of the role of the Banzhaf power index. We prove
two theorems for manipulation by merging and annexation, and show several
attractive properties in these two processes.
ACM Computing Classification System (1998): J.4, I.2.1.
Keywords:
Weighted Voting Game, Manipulation, Swing, Merging, Annexation, Banzhaf Index
@article{SJC_2017_11_1_a4,
author = {Slavov, Zdravko and Evans, Christina},
title = {Manipulation by {Merging} and {Annexation} in {Weighted} {Voting} {Games}},
journal = {Serdica Journal of Computing},
pages = {059--072},
year = {2017},
volume = {11},
number = {1},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/SJC_2017_11_1_a4/}
}
Slavov, Zdravko; Evans, Christina. Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games. Serdica Journal of Computing, Tome 11 (2017) no. 1, pp. 059-072. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/SJC_2017_11_1_a4/