The first part of this paper expresses some reservations about certain ways in which the principle of charity has been employed. Some deflationary remarks criticize the application of some pet western ideas to the analysis of other cultures, namely mentalities, metaphors, mythology. I turn next to suggest that, contrary to the claim of the defenders of the principle of charity, intelligibility cannot be a universal assumption considering the various roles that deception and the cultivation of unintelligibility can play. Finally, I shall discuss the issues of a common logic and a common ontology to underline the diversity of logics and ontologies. This diversity has often been seen as a major hazard, one that in the guise of incommensurability threatens to block all communication across cultures. Yet, by stressing the importance of learning, instead of focusing on the criterion of translation, one might turn this diversity from a potential embarrassment into a source of new insights.
@article{PHSC_2002__6_2_163_0,
author = {Lloyd, G. E. R.},
title = {{\guillemotleft} {Comment} ne pas \^etre charitable dans l'interpr\'etation {\guillemotright}},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
pages = {163--179},
year = {2002},
publisher = {\'Editions Kim\'e},
volume = {6},
number = {2},
language = {fr},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_163_0/}
}
Lloyd, G. E. R. « Comment ne pas être charitable dans l'interprétation ». Philosophia Scientiae, L’usage anthropologique du principe de charité, Tome 6 (2002) no. 2, pp. 163-179. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_163_0/