Geodesic
Side-channel attacks countermeasure based on decomposed S-boxes for Kuznyechik
Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 12 (2021) no. 2, pp. 147-157 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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The paper describes an implementation of the Russian cryptographic standard GOST 34.12-2018 (algorithm Kuznyechik) protected against side-channel attacks. Protection method is based on the decomposition of the S-box (algorithm substitution) and allows a gain in performance and required memory in comparison with universal methods of masking. 
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     title = {Side-channel attacks countermeasure based on decomposed {S-boxes} for {Kuznyechik}},
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T. A. Lavrenteva; S. V. Matveev. Side-channel attacks countermeasure based on decomposed S-boxes for Kuznyechik. Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 12 (2021) no. 2, pp. 147-157. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MVK_2021_12_2_a9/

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