Geodesic
GOST 28147-89 masking against side channel attacks
Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 6 (2015) no. 2, pp. 35-43 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Side-channel attacks exploit leakage from the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm to obtain some additional information on its secret parameters. During the last decade we observe the intensive development of various side-channel attacks, that affect security of many popular cryptosystems. In an attempt to reduce the possible damage a general method that masks the intermediate data was proposed. This method was studied for popular cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, DES, AES and several of the AES candidates. In this paper we propose a strategy of masking for Russian cryptographic standard GOST 28147-89 and perform an analysis of its properties. 
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S. V. Matveev. GOST 28147-89 masking against side channel attacks. Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 6 (2015) no. 2, pp. 35-43. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MVK_2015_6_2_a4/

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