Nonmonotonically rewarded job scheduling
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 1, pp. 85-101
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This paper describes new model of job scheduling problem generalized for nonmonotonical reward functions. Importance of informational asymmetry is shown for conflict in consideration, leading to connection with «theory of conspiracies». Structurally consistent equilibria is demostrated to be acceptable as solution concept.
Keywords:
job scheduling, informational asymmetry, nonbinding agreements.
@article{MGTA_2022_14_1_a3,
author = {Maxim A. Savchenko},
title = {Nonmonotonically rewarded job scheduling},
journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
pages = {85--101},
year = {2022},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_1_a3/}
}
Maxim A. Savchenko. Nonmonotonically rewarded job scheduling. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 1, pp. 85-101. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_1_a3/
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