Geodesic
Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 12 (2020) no. 1, pp. 3-18

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The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner's choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.
Keywords: dynamic non-antagonistic game, optimum regime of the information receipt, Nash equilibrium. 
@article{MGTA_2020_12_1_a0,
     author = {Elena Z. Mokhonko},
     title = {Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game},
     journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
     pages = {3--18},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {12},
     number = {1},
     year = {2020},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a0/}
}
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Elena Z. Mokhonko. Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 12 (2020) no. 1, pp. 3-18. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a0/