Strong time-consistent subset of core in cooperative differential games with finite time horizon

Ovanes L. Petrosyan ; Ekaterina V. Gromova ; Sergey V. Pogozhev

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 8 (2016) no. 4, pp. 79-106.

Résumé

Time-consistency is one of the most important properties of the solution in cooperative differential games. Core is chosen as a cooperative solution in the game. In the paper the strong time-consistent subset of the core is constructed. Construction of the subset is based upon the special class of imputation distribution procedures (IDP). For the game model of pollution control such solution is defined.

Détail

Keywords: cooperative differential games, time-consistency, strong time-consistency, imputation distribution procedure
Mots-clés : core.

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