Geodesic
Bioresorce management problem with different harvesting times
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 6 (2014) no. 3, pp. 54-75.

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Discrete-time game-theoretic model related to a bioresource management problem (fishery) is investigated. The players are countries or fishing firms that harvest the fish stock. Players differ in their time preferences, and use different discount factors. Furthermore, the players have different planning horizons. The main goal here is to construct the value function for the cooperative solution and to distribute the joint payoff among the players. We propose to use recursive Nash bargaining solution to determine cooperative behavior. 
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     author = {Anna N. Rettieva},
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Anna N. Rettieva. Bioresorce management problem with different harvesting times. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 6 (2014) no. 3, pp. 54-75. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2014_6_3_a2/

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