Geodesic
Coalition structure stability in a~model of bank cooperation
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 4, pp. 45-62.

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In the paper a problem of bank costs reduction is considered. In the coalition case, it is assumed that cooperation may be restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Theoretical results are illustrated by numerical examples.
Mots-clés : coalition, stable coalitional structure
Keywords: cost allocation, Shapley value. 
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Elena M. Parilina; Artem A. Sedakov. Coalition structure stability in a~model of bank cooperation. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 4, pp. 45-62. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2012_4_4_a2/

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