Geodesic
Information solvability in multistage games with a finite set of players
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 2, pp. 81-101 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Multistage games with separated dynamics are considered in the paper. The basis of extensive form dynamic game simulation is a definition of its information structure. J. von Neumann, G. Owen, H. W. Kuhn and others simulated information by means of information sets in their constructions. No doubt, this is a rigorous approach but it has an evident drawback of excessive generality. In the present paper information structure is simulated by means of information vector-functions of players. But apparently not any ordered according to players collection of information vector-functions corresponds to an adequate description of information structure process dynamics. In the paper the adequacy mentioned is defined by the concept of information solvability of an ordered information vector-function collection.
Keywords: multistage game, extensive game form, information vector-function, information solvability of an ordered collection of information vector-functions. 
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Nikolai M. Slobozhanin. Information solvability in multistage games with a finite set of players. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 2, pp. 81-101. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2011_3_2_a4/

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