Geodesic
Proportional solutions for bargaining games and NTU games
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 2 (2010) no. 3, pp. 41-78.

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The paper studies the properties of proportional solutions for bargaining games and NTU games based on the proportional excess. The status quo-proportional solution for bargaining games is defind. It's consistency (in Hart–Mas-Collel sense) is proved, and an axiomatic characterization with consistency property is given. A consistent continuatuon of the solution to NTU game is defind, and the uniqueness theorem is proved. Some relations between bargaining and NTU solutions are given.
Keywords: bargaining games, NTU games, status quo-proportional solution, consistency.
Mots-clés : proportional excess 
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Sergei L. Pechersky. Proportional solutions for bargaining games and NTU games. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 2 (2010) no. 3, pp. 41-78. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2010_2_3_a3/

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