Geodesic
A tax game in a Cournot duopoly
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 1, pp. 3-15.

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Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels.
Keywords: hierarchical structures, multi-level Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash-Cournot equilibrium. 
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Alexander Galegov; Andrey Garnaev. A tax game in a Cournot duopoly. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 1, pp. 3-15. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_1_a0/

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