A tax game in a Cournot duopoly
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 1, pp. 3-15
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Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels.
Keywords:
hierarchical structures, multi-level Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
@article{MGTA_2009_1_1_a0,
author = {Alexander Galegov and Andrey Garnaev},
title = {A tax game in a {Cournot} duopoly},
journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
pages = {3--15},
year = {2009},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_1_a0/}
}
Alexander Galegov; Andrey Garnaev. A tax game in a Cournot duopoly. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 1, pp. 3-15. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_1_a0/
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