Geodesic
Top responsiveness and Nash stability in coalition formation games
Kybernetika, Tome 42 (2006) no. 4, pp. 453-460 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Czech Digital Mathematics Library

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Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [AR] to guarantee the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is imposed.
Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [AR] to guarantee the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is imposed.
Classification : 91A12
Keywords: coalition formation; hedonic games; Nash stability; top responsiveness 
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     title = {Top responsiveness and {Nash} stability in coalition formation games},
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Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin. Top responsiveness and Nash stability in coalition formation games. Kybernetika, Tome 42 (2006) no. 4, pp. 453-460. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/KYB_2006_42_4_a4/

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