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Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games
Kybernetika, Tome 32 (1996) no. 5, pp. 483-490 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Czech Digital Mathematics Library

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Classification : 90D12, 91A12 
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Stefanescu, Anton. Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games. Kybernetika, Tome 32 (1996) no. 5, pp. 483-490. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/KYB_1996_32_5_a4/

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