Stability of coalition structures and imputations in coalition-games
Kybernetika, Tome 10 (1974) no. 6, pp. 461-490
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Czech Digital Mathematics Library
@article{KYB_1974_10_6_a0,
author = {Mare\v{s}, Milan},
title = {Stability of coalition structures and imputations in coalition-games},
journal = {Kybernetika},
pages = {461--490},
year = {1974},
volume = {10},
number = {6},
mrnumber = {0411667},
zbl = {0304.90135},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/KYB_1974_10_6_a0/}
}
Mareš, Milan. Stability of coalition structures and imputations in coalition-games. Kybernetika, Tome 10 (1974) no. 6, pp. 461-490. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/KYB_1974_10_6_a0/
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[3] Mareš M.: A Model of the Bargaining in Coalition-games with Side Payments. In: Transactions of the 6th Prague Conference on Information Theory, Statistical Decision Functions and Random Processes, 1971. Academia, Praha 1973, pp. 613-629. | MR
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