Geodesic
Survey on $SEIRD$ epidemic models with different focuses
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 17 (2024), pp. 86-104 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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This study is a survey of several extended models based on $SEIRD$ epidemics. The main contribution of the review is a modification of the classical $SEIRD$ epidemic model, from single-layer to multi-layer to super-exposure, and from general vaccine to pre-emptive vaccine to two-stage evolutionary-epidemic model. Assuming the presence of two viruses in a population, simultaneous and non-simultaneous occurrence of the two viruses was compared; assuming super-exposure between multiple viruses, general and pre-emptive vaccines were compared; and assuming that individuals have decision-making power over vaccination, the effect of the basic number of infections on the evolutionary stabilisation strategy was investigated. A series of numerical experiments support the theoretical results obtained.
Keywords: evolutionary games, epidemics, preemptive vaccine.
Mots-clés : eSS 
@article{CGTM_2024_17_a8,
     author = {Xiuxiu Liu and Elena Gubar},
     title = {Survey on $SEIRD$ epidemic models with different focuses},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {86--104},
     year = {2024},
     volume = {17},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2024_17_a8/}
}
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Xiuxiu Liu; Elena Gubar. Survey on $SEIRD$ epidemic models with different focuses. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 17 (2024), pp. 86-104. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2024_17_a8/

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