Geodesic
Opinion control in a team with complete and incomplete communication
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 13 (2020), pp. 324-334.

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We examine the influence of management of the opinion of a group members, while the group of agents are considered with different communication structures. We consider the optimization problem in dynamics with feedback information structure. In the model, the communication structure plays an important role since not all agents are directly connected with each other. The influence of the agents on each other is taken into account in the equation of dynamics of agents' opinions. An agent weights the other agents' opinions and after that forms the next step opinion. Two types of communication structures are considered in the model. The results of numerical modeling illustrate the influence of some parameters of the model (control, influence power of agents on each other) on the optimal opinion dynamics.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, average opinion, feedback optimal control, Bellman function, communication structure. 
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     author = {Vladimir V. Mazalov and Yulia A. Dorofeeva and Elena M. Parilina},
     title = {Opinion control in a team with complete and incomplete communication},
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     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2020_13_a16/}
}
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Vladimir V. Mazalov; Yulia A. Dorofeeva; Elena M. Parilina. Opinion control in a team with complete and incomplete communication. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 13 (2020), pp. 324-334. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2020_13_a16/

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