Geodesic
Static game theoretic models of coordination of private and public interests in economic systems
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 79-93.

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A problem of inefficiency of equilibria (system compatibility) in static game theoretic models of resource allocation is investigated. It is shown that the system compatibility in such models is possible if and only if all agents are individualists or collectivists. Administrative and economic control mechanisms providing the system compatibility are analyzed.
Keywords: coordination of interests, hierarchical games, public goods economy, resource allocation. 
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Olga. I. Gorbaneva; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky. Static game theoretic models of coordination of private and public interests in economic systems. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 79-93. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2017_10_a6/

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