Coordination in multilevel supply chain

Ekaterina N. Zenkevich ; Yulia E. Lonyagina ; Maria V. Fattakhova

Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 350-374.

Résumé

There is a task of coordination in the multilevel supply chains with the tree-like structure taking into consideration the linearity of supply in the final markets that is discussed in this article. Three ways are suggested by authors in order to solve the chain coordination problem, i. e. to the rule of the players strategies choice that are satisfying the certain criteria of optimality. The first way is a decentralized solution that will be issued only when all the supply chain participants act independently from each other. The second way is the optimization of the overall chains revenue in the cooperative game, so called centralized solution. Finally, the third solution is the Nash weighted solution that is created by the optimization of the Nash weighted multiplication. Based on the particular example there is a comparison of all the ways discussed in the article.

Détail

Keywords: multilevel supply chains, tree-like structure, overall chains revenue, Nash weighted solution.

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