Geodesic
On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 51-60 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Keywords: equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, game in strategic form, public good.
Mots-clés : Coalition formation, Cournot oligopoly 
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     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2014_7_a5/}
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Michael Finus; Pierre von Mouche; Bianca Rundshagen. On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 51-60. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2014_7_a5/

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