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Coalitional Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Projects with Different Preferences of Players
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 178-188 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Let be $N$ the set of players and $M$ the set of projects. The coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as family of games with different fixed coalitional partitions for each project that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies are decisions about each of the project. Players can form coalitions in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each project a coalitional game is defined. In each coalitional game it is required to find in some sense optimal solution. Solving successively each of the coalitional games, we get the set of optimal $n$-tuples for all coalitional games. It is required to find a compromise solution for the choice of a project, i. e. it is required to find a compromise coalitional partition. As an optimality principles are accepted generalized PMS-vector (Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009; Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006) and its modifications, and compromise solution (Malafeyev, 2001). The proposed paper is the generalization of the paper “Static Model of Decision-making over the Set of Coalitional Partitions” (Grigorieva, 2012) for the case when the preferences of players are different.
Keywords: coalitional game, PMS-vector
Mots-clés : compromise solution. 
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Xeniya Grigorieva. Coalitional Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Projects with Different Preferences of Players. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 178-188. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a11/

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