Geodesic
On the Consistency of Weak Equilibria in Multicriteria Extensive Games
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 168-177.

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This paper considers weak equilibria properties for multicriteria $n$-person extensive games. It is shown that the set of subgame perfect weak equilibriums in multicriteria games with perfect information is non-empty, however one can not use the backwards induction procedure (in the direct way) to construct equilibria in multicriteria extensive game. Furthermore, we prove that weak equilibria satisfies time consistency in multicriteria extensive games (with perfect or incomplete information).
Keywords: multicriteria games, extensive games, equilibria, time consistency. 
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     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2012_5_a16/}
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Denis Kuzyutin. On the Consistency of Weak Equilibria in Multicriteria Extensive Games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 168-177. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2012_5_a16/

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