Auctioning Big Facilities under Financial Constraints
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 132-153
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru
This paper analyzes auctions for big facilities or contracts where bidders face financial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. We show that the interaction between resale and financial constraints changes previous results on auctions with financial constraints and those in auctions with resale. The reason is the link between the resale price and the auction price introduced by the presence of financial constraints. Such link induces a potential loser to modify the auction price in order to fine-tune the winner's resale offer, which may require forcing the winner to be financially constrained.
Keywords:
auctions, big facilities, resale, financial constraints, subcontracting.
@article{CGTM_2011_4_a10,
author = {Mar{\'\i}a \'Angeles de Frutos and Mar{\'\i}a Paz Espinosa},
title = {Auctioning {Big} {Facilities} under {Financial} {Constraints}},
journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
pages = {132--153},
year = {2011},
volume = {4},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a10/}
}
María Ángeles de Frutos; María Paz Espinosa. Auctioning Big Facilities under Financial Constraints. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 132-153. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a10/