Strong Equilibrium in Differential Games
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 468-485
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In this paper two definitions of strong equilibrium are considered: strong equilibrium in broad and narrow senses. The main result of the paper is sufficient conditions for strong equilibrium existence in differential games. A special technique based on scalarization of vector criteria is used to construct strong equilibrium in broad sense. This approach is tested on example of the differential game with three players.
Keywords:
Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, dynamic programming.
@article{CGTM_2010_3_a35,
author = {Andrey V. Zyatchin},
title = {Strong {Equilibrium} in {Differential} {Games}},
journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
pages = {468--485},
year = {2010},
volume = {3},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a35/}
}
Andrey V. Zyatchin. Strong Equilibrium in Differential Games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 468-485. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a35/
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