Geodesic
Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 251-259

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
Keywords: In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems. 
@article{CGTM_2009_2_a19,
     author = {Somdeb Lahiri},
     title = {Three-Sided {Matchings} and {Separable} {Preferences}},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {251--259},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {2},
     year = {2009},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2009_2_a19/}
}
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Somdeb Lahiri. Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 251-259. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2009_2_a19/