Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 251-259.

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In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
Keywords: In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
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Somdeb Lahiri. Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 251-259. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2009_2_a19/

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