Geodesic
Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 277-285

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems. 
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     author = {Somdeb Lahiri},
     title = {Three-Sided {Matchings} and {Separable} {Preferences}},
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     year = {2007},
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     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a16/}
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Somdeb Lahiri. Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 277-285. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a16/