Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 277-285
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In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
@article{CGTM_2007_1_a16,
author = {Somdeb Lahiri},
title = {Three-Sided {Matchings} and {Separable} {Preferences}},
journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
pages = {277--285},
year = {2007},
volume = {1},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a16/}
}
Somdeb Lahiri. Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 277-285. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a16/
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