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A Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief
Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 51 (2022) no. 1, pp. 57-71.

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In this paper we analyse logic of false belief in the intuitionistic setting. This logic, studied in its classical version by Steinsvold, Fan, Gilbert and Venturi, describes the following situation: a formula φ is not satisfied in a given world, but we still believe in it (or we think that it should be accepted). Another interpretations are also possible: e.g. that we do not accept φ but it is imposed on us by a kind of council or advisory board. From the mathematical point of view, the idea is expressed by an adequate form of modal operator 𝖶 which is interpreted in relational frames with neighborhoods. We discuss monotonicity of forcing, soundness, completeness and several other issues. Finally, we mention the fact that it is possible to investigate intuitionistic logics of unknown truths.
Keywords: Intuitionistic modal logic, non-normal modal logic, neighborhood semantics 
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Witczak, Tomasz. A Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 51 (2022) no. 1, pp. 57-71. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/BSL_2022_51_1_a1/

[1] J. Fan, Notes on neighborhood semantics for logics of unknown truths and false beliefs (2020), arXiv:2002.09622, math.LO.

[2] D. Gilbert, G. Venturi, Neighborhood Semantics for Logics of Unknown Truths and False Beliefs, The Australasian Journal of Logic, vol. 14(1) (2017), pp. 246–267 | DOI

[3] C. Steinsvold, Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 52(3) (2011), pp. 245–253 | DOI

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