Geodesic
Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures
Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 50 (2021) no. 2, pp. 131-149.

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After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of (dis)agreement based on (exact) truthmaker semantics.
Keywords: value, disagreement, truthmaker semantics, hyperintensionality 
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Faroldi, Federico L. G. Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 50 (2021) no. 2, pp. 131-149. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/BSL_2021_50_2_a1/

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