Equilibrium analysis of distributed aggregative game with misinformation
Kybernetika, Tome 60 (2024) no. 6, pp. 754-778
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This paper considers a distributed aggregative game problem for a group of players with misinformation, where each player has a different perception of the game. Player's deception behavior is inevitable in this situation for reducing its own cost. We utilize hypergame to model the above problems and adopt $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for hypergame to investigate whether players believe in their own cognition. Additionally, we propose a distributed deceptive algorithm for a player implementing deception and demonstrate the algorithm converges to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for hypergame. Further, we provide conditions for the deceptive player to enhance its profit and offer the optimal deceptive strategy at a given tolerance $\epsilon$. Finally, we present the effectiveness of the algorithm through numerical experiments.
This paper considers a distributed aggregative game problem for a group of players with misinformation, where each player has a different perception of the game. Player's deception behavior is inevitable in this situation for reducing its own cost. We utilize hypergame to model the above problems and adopt $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for hypergame to investigate whether players believe in their own cognition. Additionally, we propose a distributed deceptive algorithm for a player implementing deception and demonstrate the algorithm converges to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for hypergame. Further, we provide conditions for the deceptive player to enhance its profit and offer the optimal deceptive strategy at a given tolerance $\epsilon$. Finally, we present the effectiveness of the algorithm through numerical experiments.
DOI : 10.14736/kyb-2024-6-0754
Classification : 68W15, 68W40, 91A10
Keywords: distributed aggregative game; deceptive strategy; hypergame; $\epsilon $-Nash equilibrium for hypergame
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Yuan, Meng; Cheng, Zhaoyang; Ma, Te. Equilibrium analysis of distributed aggregative game with misinformation. Kybernetika, Tome 60 (2024) no. 6, pp. 754-778. doi: 10.14736/kyb-2024-6-0754

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