Geodesic
Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems
Kybernetika, Tome 56 (2020) no. 2, pp. 261-277

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This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched Stackelberg game framework is proposed to analyze the interdependent decision-making processes. A receding-horizon switched Stackelberg strategy for the controller is derived subsequently, which, together with the corresponding best response of the attacker, constitutes the switched Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system under the switched Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed if the switching signal exhibits a certain average dwell time. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in this paper.
DOI : 10.14736/kyb-2020-2-0261
Classification : 91A50, 91A65, 91A80
Keywords: networked control systems; false data injection attacks; switched systems; switched Stackelberg games; switched Stackelberg equilibrium 
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     author = {Huang, Yabing and Zhao, Jun},
     title = {Switched {Stackelberg} game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems},
     journal = {Kybernetika},
     pages = {261--277},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {56},
     number = {2},
     year = {2020},
     doi = {10.14736/kyb-2020-2-0261},
     mrnumber = {4103717},
     zbl = {07250724},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.14736/kyb-2020-2-0261/}
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Huang, Yabing; Zhao, Jun. Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems. Kybernetika, Tome 56 (2020) no. 2, pp. 261-277. doi: 10.14736/kyb-2020-2-0261

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